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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the causal effect of electoral systems on the
performance of clientelistic vs. programmatic parties. We argue that,
contrary to majoritarian systems, proportional systems disfavor clien-
telistic parties as voters can hardly be pivotal for electing their local
patron. We test this insight using data from local elections in Morocco
from 2003 and 2009. We use a regression discontinuity approach exploit-
ing the fact that the law stipulates a population threshold below which
the system is majoritarian and above which it is proportional. Results
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show a differential causal effect of proportional systems on program-
matic and clientelistic parties: Clientelistic parties halve their seats and
the programmatic party doubles them when crossing the threshold of
proportionality. An important caveat is that the sample size around
the threshold being relatively small, some coefficients are estimated
relatively imprecisely. Fixed effects estimates exploiting a change in
threshold from 2003 to 2009 yield similar results.
In many developing countries, clientelistic parties are dominant in electoral
contests. Such parties have persisted in spite of modernization and democ-
ratization processes, both in the form of so-called party machines that rely
on brokers to mobilize clients and of more caucus style parties that rely on
all sorts of notables for this task (Piattoni, 2001; Roniger and Gunes-Ayata,
1994). How clientelistic parties operate, gain support and monitor the com-
pliance of their voters has received increasing interest in recent years from
political scientists and economists alike (see, for instance, Bardhan et al.,
2008; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Hicken, 2011; Manacorda et al., 2011;
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007b; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Stokes, 2005;
Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009; Wantchekon, 2003). The type of linkage
these parties establish with voters - where especially poorer voters exchange
their say in the political process for some form of particularistic good — is
conflicting with the spirit of democratic elections (Stokes, 2007). Addition-
ally, and to some extent as a result of the distortion of democratic repre-
sentation, clientelism is also associated with bad economic outcomes, such
as inequality persistence, the inefficient allocation of public resources, and
worse public services for the poor (see Pellicer, 2009; Bardhan and Mooker-
jee, 2012; Keefer and Khemani, 2005).
In spite of the strong research interest that clientelism has generated
in the last decade, there is still relatively little knowledge about its
determinants. This is probably in part because clientelism is so difficult
to measure. Low levels of economic development as well as poverty are
generally associated with clientelism (Brusco et al., 2004; Calvo and
Murillo, 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a). Several authors have also
argued that robust political competition benefits programmatic parties
(e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a; Grzymala-Busse, 2007) although this
is not uncontested (e.g., Lindberg and Morrison, 2008).
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Little is known regarding the impact of political institutions, such as elec-
toral rules, on clientelism. Electoral rules are likely to be relevant, since they
affect the strategic calculations of parties and voters (see Duverger, 1954;
Riker, 1982; Cox, 1997; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, among many others in
a vast literature). Among other things, electoral rules affect the relative elec-
toral value of emphasizing individual characteristics of politicians vs. party
platforms/labels. Systems that pit individual candidates against each other,
such as majoritarian systems and open list Proportional Representation
(PR), provide incentives to cultivate a ‘‘personal vote’’ as opposed to party
labels (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Lancaster, 1986; Shugart et al., 2005). On
the basis of such insights, Piattoni (2008) and Kitschelt (2000) articulate the
intuition that these types of electoral systems benefit clientelism. However,
even if this is plausible, it is difficult to ascertain empirically. The main rea-
son is that electoral rules typically vary only at the cross-country level, and
many factors that are difficult to control for could be behind any observed
correlation. More generally, as stated by Hicken (2011), institutional choice
is likely to be endogenous to preferences regarding clientelism so that an
independent role of electoral institutions is particularly difficult to identify.
In this paper, we study the effect of electoral rules on the success of clien-
telistic vs. programmatic parties in Morocco in the local elections of 2003 and
2009. Our analysis uses what we believe is a credible identification strategy
to estimate the effects of electoral rules. We exploit the fact that a popula-
tion threshold was introduced in 2003, stipulating that municipalities with
less than 25,000 inhabitants hold elections with a majoritarian systems, and
municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants under PR.1 This institu-
tional feature allows us to employ a regression discontinuity approach to
uncover the causal effect of the electoral system on the success of differ-
ent parties. The regression discontinuity approach essentially estimates and
compares the performance of each party in towns at either side of, and very
close to, the threshold. The idea is that towns with around 24,000 inhabi-
tants are likely to be very similar to towns with around 26,000 inhabitants,
except for the fact that the former had a majoritarian system and the latter
had a proportional one. If party performance differs across these types of
town, this difference can be quite safely attributed to the electoral system.
We provide a simple argument, complementary to the insight mentioned
above, for why majoritarian systems may encourage clientelism. Whereas
1 In 2009, the population threshold increased to 35,000.
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majoritarian systems allow clients to reward their patrons with their vote
directly, proportional closed list systems make it impossible for clients to
select their patron and thereby reward her for her services. Thus, in propor-
tional closed list systems, voters are more likely to follow their programmatic
inclinations. This insight differs slightly from the one suggested in the liter-
ature, in that it focuses on the strategic behavior of voters instead of that of
politicians. The argument actually comes from a local politician in Morocco,
whose town had been switched to PR in 2003. He complained about PR,
saying that in the previous single member districts, he ‘‘didn’t even have
to campaign’’ because ‘‘everybody knew him’’ and was ‘‘grateful’’ for the
‘‘services he had provided.’’ Now, he was buried in a list of 25 people for the
whole town where people could not select him personally any longer so that
he ‘‘could not be sure that he would be elected.’’ 2
To test this insight, we construct two municipal level datasets, one for 2003
and one for 2009, merging the respective election results with population
data and some municipal characteristics. The election data contains the
number of seats won by each party in each municipality (no information on
votes is available).
We classify the major Moroccan parties into clientelistic parties, program-
matic parties, and parties in-between. This classification is based on the
historical origins and evolution of different political parties in Morocco. Our
classification is consistent with the programmatic and clientelistic scores in
data from the Political Accountability Project by Herbert Kitschelt and
others at Duke University.
We estimate the causal effect of electoral rules on clientelistic, in-between
and programmatic parties using as main identification strategy a regression
discontinuity approach, as explained above. In addition, we use fixed effects
as an alternative identification strategy. The change in population threshold
from 2003 and 2009 together with heterogeneous population growth implies
that some towns that were majoritarian in 2003 became proportional in 2009
and vice versa. We exploit this variation over time to control for munici-
pal fixed effects when attempting to explain party results. This identifica-
tion strategy is less credible than the regression discontinuity one, because
changes in electoral system are correlated with population growth, and this
may bias results. However, the exercise is valuable in that the identification
assumptions are completely unrelated to those of regression discontinuity.
2 Authors’ interview with a municipal councilor in Boujaad, Morocco, November 26, 2008.
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Our results show that there is indeed a causal effect of proportional sys-
tems on the success of different types of parties in line with our hypothesis.
In the two years, parties we identify as clientelistic lose, on average, around
5 percentage points (pp.) of seats from PR. The in-between parties are
indeed in between, loosing around 2 pp. in 2003 and essentially zero in
2009. Our programmatic party, in turn, benefits from a 2 pp. increase in
seats in 2003 and around 6 pp. in 2009. These magnitudes are large in a
party system as fragmented as the Moroccan one. PR essentially halves the
seats of the clientelistic parties and doubles the seats of the programmatic
party. The fixed effect results are qualitatively and even quantitatively
similar to the regression discontinuity ones.
The robustness of our results and the validity checks we perform make
us quite confident that we uncover a differential effect of electoral rules on
parties that differ in their degree of clientelism. However, even if our classi-
fication of parties does capture differences in clientelism, our results could
be driven by something else that happens to be correlated with clientelism.
We discuss whether our results can be driven by differences in the size of
parties (a variable known to be relevant for the effect of electoral rules on
party performance) and in government/opposition status.
How relevant are our results for the impact of electoral rules on the suc-
cess of clientelistic parties more generally? Our results are quite ‘‘local,’’ in
the sense that they apply to a particular type of municipality (those with
population around 30,000 inhabitants) in a specific country. While we can-
not be sure of how well our results would actually generalize, we argue that
the type of mechanism that drives our results is likely to be widespread. In
particular, the two characteristics of Moroccan clientelistic parties that are
critical for their decline under PR are also typical for many other historical
and present-day clientelistic parties. The first is a weak organization, a char-
acteristic associated with many clientelistic parties (Gunther and Diamond,
2003; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011). Weak organizations with no clear insti-
tutions to reach legitimate decisions make it impossible to credibly promise
goods to clients of lower ranked patrons for their vote in case their patron
is not elected. As a result, clients of lower ranked patrons are more prone to
follow their programmatic inclinations under PR. The second critical feature
is that voters are clients of a specific patron, not of an organization. We
believe that this is also a characteristic of a large number of clientelistic par-
ties: parties that are collections of notables such as rural landlords or urban
businessmen who all engage in a direct exchange with clients. In contrast,
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our results are not likely to apply to machine type clientelistic parties, which
have more formal bureaucratic organizations (see Hopkin, 2006) and may
thus be able to circumvent their problems under PR. Therefore, our results
are likely to be most relevant in settings where ‘‘traditional’’ clientelism,
rather than machine clientelism, dominates.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides our concep-
tual framework for establishing a link between electoral rules and the success
of clientelistic parties. Then, we describe the Moroccan electoral law for the
local elections of 2003 and 2009 and establish the classification of Moroccan
parties into clientelistic/programmatic types. The following sections describe
the data, present our empirical approach and present the results from the
regression discontinuity approach as well as the fixed effects estimation.
Finally, we discuss the interpretation of the results and conclude.
1 Conceptual Framework
We are interested in understanding the effect of electoral rules on the preva-
lence of clientelism. Electoral rules and in particular district magnitude
potentially affects the behavior of parties and voters in a way that may
promote or discourage clientelism. The works of Carey and Shugart (1995),
Lancaster (1986), and Shugart et al. (2005) point out that majoritarian
systems/low district magnitudes as well as proportional open list systems
give incentives to politicians to emphasize personal characteristics over party
platforms. In electoral systems that pit specific candidates against each other
instead of parties, the value of promoting a party label diminishes. This can
be interpreted as encouraging clientelism and patronage from the politicians
side (Kitschelt, 2000; Piattoni, 2008).
While being intuitively plausible, no concrete mechanism by which such
systems would encourage clientelism has so far been elaborated. We argue
that at the center of such a mechanism should be the strategic calculus of
voters, an aspect that has been relatively neglected by the personal vote
literature, which tends to focus rather on the politicians.3 When focusing on
clientelism as opposed to personal vote, it seems warranted to consider that
parties and politicians find it difficult to adapt their strategies to different
3 The key exception is Shugart et al. (2005) who emphasize that personal characteristics are
information shortcuts for voters that are more important in some electoral systems than in
others.
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electoral rules, at least in the short run (i.e., to rapidly establish program-
matic linkages instead of clientelistic ones and vice-versa). Clientelistic par-
ties in developing countries usually do not have a credible platform that they
could put forward when faced with a (new) electoral rule that would war-
rant doing so. For a clientelistic party to credibly emphasize a ‘‘party label’’
and for a programmatic party to establish a clientelistic network requires
costly and lengthy investments, unlikely to yield fruits in the short run.4
In contrast, voters can adapt much faster to changes in electoral rules. We
thus elaborate on a potential mechanism on how different types of elec-
toral rules could influence the prevalence of clientelism by focusing on the
strategic considerations of voters regarding the choice between clientelistic
and programmatic parties.5 In particular, we argue that clientelistic parties,
all else being equal, will gain more support the lower the district magni-
tude (i.e., in majoritarian systems as opposed to proportional (closed list)
ones).
Our argument is simple. Consider a polity where there are two parties,
a programmatic and a clientelistic one. The clientelistic party is just a col-
lection of local patrons, with no program, and thus no value as a party.
Candidates of this party have value as individuals, but only for the inhabi-
tants of their respective neighborhood/district. The programmatic party, in
contrast, implements some program if elected, a program that for simplicity
we consider as providing some public good. The relevant trade off for vot-
ers in such a polity is essentially between the local patron and the public
goods that the programmatic party could provide. Voters will obviously dif-
fer in the value they attach to each of them. Some voters will be core voters,
unconditional either to their patron or to the programmatic party. Others
will be more opportunistic swing-voters, acknowledging the benefits of the
public goods provided by the programmatic party but possibly favoring the
clientelistic party if this has a fair chance of having their local patron elected.
We believe this setting captures well the political choices faced by citizens
in many developing contexts.
4 Some parties aim of course to pursue a mixed strategy, that could for example try to establish
clientelistic linkages in rural areas and programmatic linkages in urban areas. While some
parties have indeed the infrastructure to follow this type of strategies, we believe most parties
tend to specialize in either clientelistic or programmatic linkages.
5 We consider strategic voting as a broad concept whereby citizens take into account what other
voters do when casting their vote.
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In such a setting, electoral systems can have a strong impact on the vot-
ing behavior of the opportunists. In majoritarian systems, the choice voters
face is directly and unambiguously between the benefits provided by the
programmatic party and the benefits provided by their local patron. To the
extent that opportunists value the benefits of their local patron more than
the public good provided by the programmatic party, they will vote for the
clientelistic party. In closed list proportional systems, instead, their vote
can go to the programmatic party for strategic reasons. In proportional sys-
tems where the vote is for an established list, the order of the candidates is
crucial. Opportunists supporting patrons in end-of list neighborhoods will
realize that their local patron has little chance of being elected and will
therefore rather vote for the programmatic party. Without the support of
these opportunists, the chances of patrons positioned just above the bot-
tom of the list decrease, making their opportunistic clients less inclined to
vote for the clientelistic party. In this way, a cascade effect can be set into
motion that may swell considerably the votes of the programmatic party.6
In other words, in closed list PR, clients will hardly be pivotal to elect their
own patron, and the larger the district magnitude, the less pivotal they
will be.
In principle, a simple way to counteract this drain of the opportunists’
vote under PR would be for clientelistic parties to promise supporters of
bottom of the list patrons rewards for their vote even if their patron did
not get elected. Rewarding voters would thus become a party, instead of
a individual patron’s, business. This path would, however, require stronger
organizations than many clientelistic parties appear to have.7 In practice,
and as we will discuss in more detail in the next section, the instability of
decisions and political personnel of clientelistic parties in Morocco — and
possibly elsewhere — does not enable them to make credible commitments
to voters on a party level.
6 There is a substantial debate if such clientelistic exchanges need to be sustained by monitoring
(e.g., Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a) or if norms of reciprocity are sufficient
(e.g., Finan and Schechter, forthcoming). Our approach is compatible with both views and we
do have anecdotal evidence that more explicit monitoring (taking a picture of the ballot with
a mobile phone) as well as norms of reciprocity (where clients feel a moral obligation) are at
play in Morocco.
7 Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) find that informal organizations, that delegate their voter inter-
action to notables are particularly associated with clientelistic practices, whereas formal orga-
nizations are associated with programmatic linkages.
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2 Electoral System and Political Parties in Morocco
Morocco’s political system combines authoritarian and democratic institu-
tions. The king decides on core policies but the elected government has a say.
Multi-party elections have been held since independence in 1956. Political
parties are well-established although only few of them are institutionalized
and the party system is highly fragmented (Santucci, 2001; Willis, 2002).
Until the mid-1990s, outright electoral fraud served to ensure docile parlia-
ments dominated by pro-palace parties; since then, political liberalization
measures have included the cleaning of voters’ rolls and an increase in the
transparency of elections (Storm, 2007).
Morocco’s current electoral legislation is the regime’s response to opposi-
tion demands for a PR system (Bendourou, 2001; Ferrie´, 2002). Up to the
2000s, both national and municipal elections in Morocco were held under a
simple first-past-the-post system. In 2002, the law was changed into closed
list PR for parliamentary elections, a mixed system was adopted for munic-
ipal elections. In the 2003 municipal elections, a single member plurality
system was maintained only for towns with less than 25,000 inhabitants.
In towns with more than 25,000 inhabitants, councilors were elected under
a proportional, closed list, system.8 For the 2009 elections, the population
threshold was increased to 35,000 inhabitants.9
The Moroccan case has the advantage of allowing for a quite straightfor-
ward identification of clientelistic and programmatic parties. The dividing
line is a party’s origin, that is whether it was created from within the monar-
chy or from the ranks of the opposition. The country’s monarch is considered
to be the ‘‘ultimate patron’’ (Willis, 2002, p. 15) of a vast clientelistic net-
work established by the late King Hassan II to govern the country after
independence. This network was politically organized by means of parties
(Lust-Okar, 2005; Moore, 1993). These clientelistic parties never invested
in a political program as their core appeal to voters — and to politicians
joining them — was their access to power structures and the concurrent
ability to gain and distribute favors. Programmatic parties were created by
8 In 2003, lists needed to obtain at least 3% of the votes locally to gain seats, in 2009, the
threshold was increased to 6%. The minimum district magnitude under PR was 25 seats in
2003, 29 seats in 2009.
9 Seats are distributed according to a largest remainder formula that favours small parties, see
Gallagher (1992).
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opposition figures whose mobilization and appeal was tied to demands for
democratic reforms (Santucci, 2001).
Clientelistic parties and practices in Morocco resemble those in many
developing countries. In rural areas, parties rely on traditional notables and
tribal leaders who provide all sorts of favors throughout the legislative period
(emergency relief, payment for funerals, sheep for religious occasions, etc.)
(Leveau, 1976; Liddell, 2010). In towns, notables can also include other types
of locally relevant figures such as owners of local companies. In larger cities,
especially in districts that include shanty towns, wealthy businessmen engage
either in outright vote-buying via brokers or may even provide club goods
such as sewerage on their own account (Catusse, 2002; Zaki, 2007).
Two characteristics of these parties are important to note as they address
the question why clientlistic parties are unable to credibly promise rewards
to opportunist supporters of bottom of the list patrons under PR. First, and
most importantly, party organizations are weak and play no or only a small
role in selecting candidates and leaders and in legitimizing and enforcing
decisions (Willis, 2002). Second, notables — whether rural or urban — are
non-partisan in the sense that their loyalties are not tied to a specific political
party.10 The combination of these two factors implies that party decisions
and political personnel are unstable. Thus, parties cannot make credible
commitments to voters who are unlikely to trust that promises of rewards
are enforced if their local patron is not elected.
The most important clientelistic parties in Morocco are the Mouvement
Populaire (MP) founded in 1958 by Mohand Laenser to organize the sup-
port of the rural notables for the regime, the Rassemblement National des
Inde´pendents (RNI), founded in 1977 by Ahmed Osman, a brother in law of
King Hassan II, and the Union Constitutionelle (UC), a split off the RNI
in 1983. Since 2008, the Parti Autenticite´ et Modernite´ (PAM), established
by Fouad Ali el Himma, who has a well advertised close friendship with
King Mohammed VI (Liddell, 2010) has been a powerful addition to this
group.11 The MP, RNI, UC, and PAM (in the 2009 analysis) form the group
of clientelistic parties in our study.
Programmatic parties were founded by opposition figures or movements,
the key programmatic point being the advancement of political reforms and
10 In Morocco, this is shown by ubiquitous floor-crossing, typically when another party offers a
better deal (Willis, 2002).
11 The PAM has absorbed many politicians of other clientelistic parties and has gained the largest
number of seats in the 2009 municipal elections.
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in some cases also the promotion of social justice. With the exception of the
1950s and 1960s none of these parties had, however, a revolutionary agenda.
Their programs all advocate incremental democratic reforms, in line with
the official regime discourse about political development in Morocco. In the
past, the most important programmatic parties were the Istiqlal (Indepen-
dence) Party (PI), the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), and
the smaller Parti du Progre`s et du Socialisme (PPS). From the late 1990s
up until 2011, all three parties have, however, been co-opted into national
government. They have attracted more opportunistic candidates, softened
or abandoned former demands for democratization and become less distinc-
tive from the clientelistic parties. In contrast to the latter they do, however,
have more developed organizations and some rank-and-file. The PI, USFP,
and PPS will thus be considered as ambiguous, in-between parties.
In the last two decades, the most important remaining clear-cut program-
matic party has been the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD),
founded in the early 1990s. The party was invited to join national govern-
ment in 1998 together with the other opposition parties but left it after
one year because party leaders felt that the party’s platform was not taken
into consideration in government policies.12 In the meantime, the party has
invested heavily into programmatic linkages regarding both the development
of increasingly precise policies and mobilization structures to publicize the
platform and make it credible. The party organization is an important tool
for legitimizing leaders and candidates and for linking with voters. Party
officials exert relatively tight control over the MPs and municipal councilors
and enforce voting discipline as their reputation is important. They have
avoided filling their lists with notables and have a strong preference for party
candidates who are elected by the local rank-and-file.13 Our own observa-
tions of the PJD’s 2003 and 2009 electoral campaigns where we interviewed
party officials and candidates and attended electoral meetings in several
town confirm the party’s focus on programmatic linkages. The campaigns
were strongly co-ordinated from the party’s head office in Rabat. In all of the
meetings we observed, a lot of emphasis was made on the party’s platform
and on the quality of its candidates — such as their level of education. Addi-
tionally, figures on the educational and professional profile of Moroccan 2003
and 2009 municipal councilors published by the Moroccan interior ministry
12 For a detailed study of the Party of Justice and Development, see Wegner (2011).
13 See Wegner (2011), Chapter 3 on party organization.
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(Direction Ge´ne´rale des Collectivite´s Locales, 2009) support more program-
matic ambitions of the PJD compared to the average Moroccan party. PJD
councilors are by far more educated than average councilors.14 The majority
of PJD councilors are teachers — an unlikely profile for a patron — com-
pared to a majority of farmers — a likely occupation of a local notables —
for the average councilor. This combined evidence makes us confident to
classify the PJD as the programmatic party of this study.
Our confidence in our ranking of key Moroccan parties into clientelistic,
in-between and programmatic parties is further enhanced by its strong cor-
relation with data collected by the Political Accountability in Democratic
Party Competition and Economic Governance Project of Herbert Kitschelt
and others. In this project, an expert survey targeted the type of linkages
parties were establishing with voters and how much effort parties were mak-
ing in establishing these linkages.15 Most of the parties considered in this
paper were included, the exceptions being the PPS, the UC, and the PAM.16
Table 1 exhibits the mean scores for our programmatic, in-between,
and clientelistic groups according to the Political Accountability Project,
divided in programmatic and clientelistic linkages. For all the indicators,
higher scores imply more programmatic/clientelistic linkages, respectively.
The scores for programmatic and clientelistic effort are the answers to two
Table 1. Indicators of clientelism and programmaticness, by type of party.
Programmatic In-between Clientelistic
PJD USFP istiqlal RNI MP
Programmatic effort 3.6 3 2.3
Programmatic indices cosalpo3econ 0.16 0.13 0.07
cosalpo4 0.13 0.11 0.1
Clientelistic effort 2.7 3.1 3.5
Clientelism index 12 13.6 14.7
14 Only 10% of PJD councilors have only primary education or less, compared to half for average
councilors. 60% of PJD councillors are university educated, compared to 20% for the average
councilor.
15 13 experts completed the survey in Morocco.
16 The survey questionnaire and information about the project is available at http://www.duke.
edu/web/democracy
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general questions asking directly about the extent to which parties seek to
mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party’s
platform (programmatic effort) or the capacity of the party to deliver tar-
geted material benefits (clientelistic effort).
In addition to questions asking directly about clientelistic and program-
matic effort, Kitschelt and Freeze (2000) construct indices of clientelistic
and programmatic linkages.17 As shown in Table 1, our programmatic party
consistently gets the highest score on programmatic effort and linkages and
the lowest on clientelistic effort and linkages while the opposite is true for
our clientelistic parties. In all cases, the ‘‘in-between’’ parties lie indeed in-
between the other two groups.
3 Data
Our aim is to understand the effect of the electoral system on the success
of different types of parties. The main identification strategy we use is a
regression discontinuity approach that exploits the fact that the electoral
system in Moroccan local elections is designed to change from majoritarian
to proportional at a given population threshold. Our approach thus requires
a dataset that contains, at the municipal level: 1. electoral results, 2. popu-
lation, (ideally as used by the administration to assign the electoral system)
and, 3. some average demographics to serve as control and for validity checks.
We construct two datasets, one for 2003 and one for 2009. The details
of the construction of our datasets as well as their descriptive statistics are
in the online appendix. The 2003 dataset contains the 2003 election results
from the ministry of interior, population from the 1994 census and demo-
graphic variables from the 2004 census. The 2009 dataset contains the 2009
election results merged with population and demographic variables from the
2004 census. Moreover, we merge the two datasets to obtain a panel struc-
ture that we exploit later in the analysis. Overall, the mergers are quite
successful, and only around 2% of observations are lost. Electoral results
17 Regarding programmatic linkages, they establish two indices that measure issue cohesion,
salience and distinctiveness (cosalpo3econ and cosalpo4). For clientelistic linkages, they con-
struct an index that adds up answers regarding how much effort parties make in providing
different types of particularistic goods to voters, such as gifts and access to social policy enti-
tlements. Notice that these indices are arguably more trustworthy because they should suffer
less from possible biases that experts may display regarding their opinions about the degree of
clientelism or programmaticness of parties.
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have information only on seats, not on votes. Thus, we measure party success
as the proportion of seats won by the party in each municipality. Municipal
characteristics from the census data include, in addition to population, vari-
ables such as literacy rates, percent of mobile phones, rates of public and
private employment, age structure, etc.
For 2003 we feel confident that the 1994 population data we use is precisely
the one used by the administration to implement the electoral law.18 Thus,
for 2003 we use a sharp regression discontinuity design. For 2009, in contrast,
the mapping between the electoral system and our 2004 population variable
is not sharp. This is likely to be because there was a substantial redistricting
in 2008, just before the 2009 elections. Since we have no information on the
specifics of the redistricting, we are forced to use the 2004 population data as
the forcing variable in the regression discontinuity analysis, which becomes,
as a result, fuzzy.19
Our empirical approach relies heavily on the municipalities around the
threshold of proportionality (25,000 in 2003 and 35,000 in 2009). Thus, we
restrict ourselves to municipalities below 100,000 inhabitants. After merging
and cutting these large municipalities we end up with sample sizes of 1,471
for 2003 and 1,449 for 2009. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the population
across municipalities. The figure shows that most of the Moroccan munici-
palities are small, way below the corresponding thresholds, particularly for
2009. For 2003, there are 95 municipalities in a ±5,000 window around the
threshold and 266 within a ±10,000 window. For 2009, the figures are only
36 and 92, respectively.
4 Empirical Approach
To identify the causal effect of electoral rules on the success of different
types of party we rely mainly on a regression discontinuity approach (RD),
exploiting the discontinuity of the electoral system at a particular population
18 See online appendix.
19 Using 2004 population as forcing variable for the 2009 elections turns out to have both a
disadvantage and an advantage. The disadvantage is that this may introduce additional noise
in our estimation, as the population measure used does not correspond to the true population
at election time. The advantage is that, if the redistricting happened for political reasons, using
the true population in 2009 could threaten our identification strategy: potentially, governing
parties could put pressure to have their population changed to end up at the side of the
threshold more beneficial to them; municipalities at different sides of the threshold on the basis
of the 2009 true population data would end up being different. The 2004 population data,
which pre-dates the process, avoids this problem.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Population in 2003 and 2009 elections.
threshold. A growing literature in economics and political science uses this
approach to uncover the causal effect of electoral rules on different types
of variables (see Gagliarducci et al., 2011; Eggers, 2010; Pettersson-Lidbom
and Tyrefors, 2009). To the extent that other potentially relevant variables
are continuous at the respective threshold, the jump in seat shares at the
threshold represents the causal effect of the electoral system on the perfor-
mance of the different parties.20
For 2003 we use a sharp design, considering that 1994 population perfectly
determines the electoral system. For each type of party j (clientelistic, pro-
grammatic and in-between), we estimate the following model, using simple
OLS with robust standard errors:
yji = β0 + f(pi) + γTi + β1Xi + εi (1)
Ti =
{
1 if pi > p˜
0 if pi ≤ p˜
where i indexes municipalities. Thus, yji is the average share of seats in
municipality i of the parties we have included in category j. f(pi) is some
possibly nonlinear but continuous function of population that captures the
effect of population on the success of different types of parties. We allow
for different polynomial specifications of f(pi) with and without spline. Ti is
20 See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) for details on regression
discontinuity designs.
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an indicator function that measures treatment status, whether the electoral
system is proportional as opposed to majoritarian, as given by the popu-
lation threshold p˜, which in 2003 equals 25,000. Xi is a vector of controls
such as number of councilors, municipal socioeconomic characteristics and
provincial dummies. Finally, εi is an error term.
The key identification assumption of the RD approach is that f(pi) is
continuous around p˜: i.e., conditional on the number of councilors (and other
controls if applicable), nothing potentially relevant jumps at the threshold.
In that case, γ captures the jump in the dependent variable at the threshold
p˜ over and above the smooth change captured by f(pi). Thus, γ is the local
causal effect of interest, where local refers to the type of municipality with
population around the threshold. Intuitively, if nothing relevant jumps at
the threshold and we observe a jump in our dependent variable, this jump
ought to be caused by the change in treatment status at the threshold.21
From an inference point of view, our key limitation is the small sample size
around the threshold. This implies that coefficients are often not precisely
estimated. To partially address this, we use several specifications for f(pi),
estimating a variety of polynomial models using different windows around
the discontinuity point and controlling for several sets of variables. While
this does not make estimates more precise it allows to verify whether the
coefficient of interest is stable under different specifications.
Our choice of specifications is informed by the cross validation criterion
(see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) and is discussed in the online appendix. Our
preferred specifications will be a linear spline with bandwidth of 15,000 and
a fifth order polynomial with no spline using the full sample. In addition,
to check the robustness of the results to observations close to the threshold,
we will also use a linear spline with a window of 5,000.22 Finally, the linear
spline with 15,000 window will be augmented with a variety of controls.23
21 In our case, the number of councilors does jump at the threshold p˜. However, since it jumps
at many other thresholds (7,500, 12,500, 15,000, and 50,000), its effect can be netted out from
our treatment effect of interest by conditioning. Moreover, the jump in number of councilors
at p˜ is small, from 23 to 25 (as opposed to, for instance, from 15 to 23 at the 15,000 population
threshold) so that it is highly unlikely that it would drive the results we obtain. Nevertheless,
to make sure that it is not the number of councilors that is driving our results, we include the
thresholds where the number of councilors changes in placebo tests below.
22 In the specification with the 5,000 window, we cannot control for number of councillors as this
variable becomes collinear with the treatment.
23 In the models with spline, we center the population variable around p˜ in order for the OLS
coefficient estimates to yield the jump at the discontinuity point.
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For 2009, due to imperfect compliance, it is necessary to use fuzzy RD.
This amounts to estimating Equation (1), where the treatment Ti is now to
have a proportional as opposed to a majoritarian system. This treatment
is then instrumented by the assignment variable Zi, which is simply the
indicator function for municipalities of population higher than the relevant
2009 threshold p˜. For 2009 we run the similar specifications as for 2003, with
and without interactions, and with full as well as restricted samples.24,25
In addition to regression discontinuity, we use a second unrelated iden-
tification strategy: to control for municipal fixed effects. The change in
population threshold from 2003 to 2009 together with population growth
implies that the electoral system of some municipalities changed from 2003
to 2009. Municipalities with population less than 25,000 in 2003 but more
than 35,000 in 2009 would have shifted from majoritarian to proportional
while those that had population higher than 25,000 in 2003 but lower than
35,000 in 2009 would have shifted from proportional to majoritarian. This
allows us to control for municipality fixed effects when estimating the effect
of the electoral system on the performance of the different types of party.
We estimate the following equation:
yjit = αi + λt + γTit + εit, (2)
where αi are municipality fixed effects, λt are time fixed effects, Tit is the
treatment (proportional system), and εit is the error term. The parameter
of interest is γ.26
This model exploits the time variation in treatment status to estimate
the treatment effect. The key identification assumption is that changes in
24 Our preferred specifications for 2009 will be a linear spline with window 25,000, and a polyno-
mial of order five using the full sample (see online appendix). We will also use a linear spline
with window 10,000 and augment the 25,000 linear spline with socioeconomic and provincial
controls. In addition, we will report models that control as well for the percent seats won in
2003 and for the electoral system in 2003 in the corresponding municipality.
25 When using instrumental variables, it is important to assess the strength of the instruments, as
the instrumental variable estimator may be problematic in small samples when the instruments
are weak. In our case, the instruments are quite strong, as only two municipalities below the
threshold are in reality proportional while eight of those above the threshold are in reality
majoritarian. The first stage regressions using our preferred specifications show a coefficient
for the assignment variable close to 0.8, and an F statistic for the significance of the excluded
instruments of more than 50, way above the rule-of-thumb value of 10 suggested by Stock et al.
(2002).
26 We cluster standard errors at the municipal level to account for the possibility of serial corre-
lation within municipalities.
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treatment status are not correlated with the error term, i.e., with the implicit
support for the given type of party.27
Because we believe that our RD identification strategy is more convincing
than the one behind our fixed effects one, we focus primarily on the RD
results. The important thing to note is that the identification assumptions
behind each of the estimators are completely different and unrelated. Thus,
we believe that results are considerably strengthened to the extent that the
two sets of estimates agree.
5 Results
5.1 Regression Discontinuity Results
We consider first the results for 2003. Following the custom in studies using
regression discontinuity (RD) designs, we present first graphical evidence of
the relation between population and the average seats of the different types
of parties around the threshold where the electoral system changes. Figure 2
presents such graphs for each type of party. The dots in the figure show the
average seats of the respective type of party at intervals of 2,500 population
windows. the lines correspond to the 5 degree polynomial fit with no spline.
These are arguably the key figures in the paper. They show, for 2003, a
strong and clear negative jump at the threshold for the clientelistic parties;
a negative yet smaller and less clear jump for the parties ‘‘in-between’’; and
a strong and clear positive jump for the programmatic party.
The sizes of the effects are important. Clientelistic parties essentially halve
their share of seats upon crossing the threshold of proportionality, from an
27 It is not clear whether this assumption holds in practice or not. There are two types of potential
violations. First, changes in treatment status, by the very structure of the data, are related
to population growth. Stagnating towns are more likely to become majoritarian whereas fast
growing towns are likely to become proportional. The features of a municipality that makes
its population grow may be linked to the success of different types of party, hence generat-
ing bias in our estimate. Another potential source of bias is gerrymandering. Some (selected)
municipalities may have been subject to redistricting precisely in order to prevent them from
becoming proportional. There is nothing we can do to address the first type of bias. For the
second type we will consider the intention-to-treat effect. We will rerun the analysis replacing
the treatment variable Tit by assignment-to-treatment variable (the indicator of whether pop-
ulation is higher than the corresponding threshold). To the extent that our population data
has not been manipulated for the elections, this approach will deal with the bias potentially
induced by gerrymandering.
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Figure 2. 2003 Discontinuity in seats for different types of party: Full
sample.
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Table 2. Discontinuity regressions for the 2003 elections.
Outcome vars 1 2 3 4 5
Clientelistic −4.19 −5.48 −4.71 −5.89 −5.55
(1.59) (1.50) (2.81) (1.69) (1.75)
In between −2.95 −2.97 −2.10 −2.58 −1.06
(1.60) (1.65) (2.59) (1.83) (1.99)
Programmatic 2.48 2.13 2.24 2.41 1.92
(1.32) (1.41) (2.00) (1.38) (1.46)
window All ±15K ±5K ±15K ±15K
poly.order 5 1 1 1 1
spline x x x x
controls Demogr Provs
N.below 1383 581 64 581 581
N.above 88 54 29 54 54
Controls in columns 4 and 5 are a set of 29 municipal characteristics
(see table on validity checks in the online appendix for a list) and a
set of provincial dummies, respectively. N.below and N.above refer to
the amount of observations above and below the threshold.
average of around 10% to around 5%. The programmatic party essentially
doubles, moving up from a very small percentage (around 2%) to almost 5%.
Table 2 provides the estimates of the models specified above for 2003. All
numbers refer to the estimate of γ, the treatment effect of interest, for the
three different types of party under the different specifications. Columns 1,
2, and 3 show the specifications with different polynomials and windows
around the threshold. The rest of the columns add different sets of controls
to the linear specification with 15,000 window. The coefficients are roughly
stable. For the clientelistic parties, the numbers are always negative, with
values from −6 to −4. For the programmatic party, the numbers are always
positive, with values always around 2. For the parties ‘‘in between,’’ the
coefficients are indeed in between, negative but typically less so than the
clientelistic ones, with values between −3 and −1.
For the clientelistic parties, the standard errors are reasonably low com-
pared to the coefficient estimates: under most specifications, the coefficients
are significant at a 1% level. For the programmatic party, p-values hover
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around 0.1, so that coefficients are sometimes significant at a 10% level and
sometimes not. However, and importantly, for both programmatic and clien-
telistic parties, the size of the coefficients remain similar even when samples
are restricted to observations very close to the threshold (5,000 window).
Also noticeable is the fact that coefficients barely change even when adding
a set of around 30 demographic controls (such as literacy, occupational and
age structure, etc.), or the full set of 59 provincial dummies (columns 4
and 5).
For 2009, the discontinuities are shown again graphically in Figure 3.
Notice that since there is no perfect compliance in 2009, the pictures refer
to the reduced form where the dependent variable is plotted directly against
the instrument. On the basis of the estimates of the first stage provided
above, the jumps observed in the pictures will be around four fifths of the
true effect.
Qualitatively, however, the pictures are useful and the message they deliver
is the same as for 2003: clientelistic parties lose and the programmatic party
gains upon crossing the proportionality threshold; parties ‘‘in between’’
experience essentially no effect. An important difference with 2003 is the
higher variability in the ‘‘dots,’’ particularly around the threshold. This
is probably mainly due to the smaller sample sizes in 2009.28 As we will
presently see, this is reflected in less precise estimates below.
Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates of our different 2009 specifications
(different polynomials and windows and different sets of controls). All num-
bers refer to the IV estimate of the effect of having a proportional system for
each type of party in each specification. The estimates are relatively similar
to those in 2003. Estimates range from −3 to −6 for the clientelistic parties.
For the programmatic party they are somewhat larger and more variable,
from 4 to 9. Notice, however, that the programmatic party obtained bet-
ter results in 2009 so that, in relative terms, the coefficients reflect similar
effects (i.e., the programmatic party doubles its share of seats upon cross-
ing the threshold). For the parties in between coefficients are around zero,
although they turn rather negative in the specifications with controls.
While the coefficients are similar to those in 2003, the standard errors
are considerably larger, making the estimates imprecise and rarely statisti-
cally significant. P -values for the clientelistic parties hover around 0.1, so
28 The measurement error of the population variable induced by the 2008 redistricting might
compound the problem.
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Figure 3. 2009 Discontinuity in seats for different types of party: Full
sample.
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Table 3. Discontinuity IV regressions for the 2009 elections.
Outcome
vars 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Clientelistic −5.03 −3.51 −6.15 −3.54 −4.12 −3.42 −3.66 −4.38
(2.84) (2.25) (4.26) (2.28) (2.42) (2.20) (2.35) (2.39)
In between −0.01 −0.02 0.85 −0.33 −0.39 −0.28 −0.74 −1.70
(3.09) (2.48) (4.53) (2.55) (2.85) (2.27) (2.66) (2.53)
Programmatic 8.40 5.30 9.17 5.92 4.27 3.83 5.98 5.74
(6.17) (4.64) (9.78) (4.93) (5.10) (3.86) (5.00) (4.48)
window All ±25K ±10K ±25K ±25K ±25K ±25K ±25K
poly.order 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
spline x x x x x x x
controls Demogr Provs PastSeats PastES D+PS+PES
N.below 1379 634 59 634 634 634 634 634
N.above 70 49 33 49 49 49 49 49
Controls in columns 6 to 8 are the percent of seats obtained by the respective type of
party in the 2003 elections, an indicator of whether the electoral system was proportional
in the 2003 elections, and the demographic, past electoral seats and past electoral system
variables simultaneuously, respectively.
that coefficients are sometimes significant at the 10% level and sometimes
not. The coefficients for the programmatic party, in turn, are never signif-
icant, even at a 10% level. Again, the fact that coefficients remain quite
stable across specifications is remarkable. For 2009, coefficients are not only
robust to a small window (10,000), to demographic variables, and to provin-
cial dummies. They are also robust to including as control past results of
the corresponding type of party in the given municipality (column 6). This
important variable is unsurprisingly always very significant in the regres-
sions. We believe that the fact that coefficients are robust to the introduction
of this control (i.e., that even accounting for past results that the parties had
in 2003, results in 2009 jump upon crossing the threshold in the expected
ways) gives a degree of confidence in our estimates. Moreover, coefficients
remain robust also to the inclusion of the 2003 electoral system as control
(column 7). This implies that the coefficients we observe for 2009 are not
just a noisy reflection of the 2003 effects.
In order to probe further the statistical significance of our results, we per-
form tests of equality of coefficients estimating the equations for different
types of party as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Our
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hypothesis holds that clientelistic parties ought to suffer from a proportional
system relative to programmatic ones. Thus, strictly speaking, our hypoth-
esis is not that effects should be different from zero for the two types of
party. Rather, the hypothesis is that the coefficient for clientelistic parties
should be smaller than that for the programmatic one. To ascertain whether
the coefficients for the different types of party are different, we estimate
our equations as a SUR system, which allows for the (realistic) possibil-
ity that unexplained electoral results across types of party are correlated
(good results of a party will typically imply worse results for the others,
see Tomz et al. (2002) for details). We estimate equations using our two
preferred specifications, both with robust standard errors. The test results
clearly reject that coefficients for the clientelistic and programmatic par-
ties are the same in 2003 (p-values less than 0.001). For 2009, rejections
are less clear although arguably sufficiently so: the linear spline with 25,000
window yields a p-value of 0.109 whereas the full sample specification yields
a p-value of 0.069. Besides these, in-between parties cannot be distinguished
from the other parties in 2009, although they do appear different than the
programmatic in 2003 (p-values less than 0.021).29
Our RD results provide quite strong evidence of a differential effect of
proportional system on different types of party. In order to make sure that
our results can be interpreted causally, we perform validity checks usual in
RD studies. The details of these validity checks are in the online appendix.
For our study, the most important concern is that population values around
the threshold might have been manipulated for political reasons. However,
this manipulation can be ruled out by the very fact that our population
data predates the elections for so many years: it seems implausible that the
1994 population figures would have been manipulated with an eye toward
the 2003 elections and similarly with the 2004 population data and the
29 As an alternative avenue to test our key argument, we stack the results of all our selected
parties together, and perform our usual regressions, but adding an indicator of each party’s
degree of clientelism and interacting this variable with the indicator of the electoral system.
We code the clientelism variable as one for clientelistic parties, zero for in-between parties, and
minus one for the programmatic party. The interaction term then captures how much bigger
is the jump at the threshold for more clientelistic parties. The results of this regression are in
Table A1 in the appendix. The table shows that, under all our usual specifications, clientelism
reduces the size of the jump at the proportionality threshold by around 3 pp. In addition to
being statistically significant, results are again remarkably similar across specifications and
across the two years.
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2009 elections. Actually, there may have been manipulation for the 2009
election via the 2008 redistricting, but by using the 2004 population data,
our approach should be immune to it. We also find no concerning evidence
of other covariates jumping at the threshold or of jumps of our outcome
variables at other thresholds. Overall, there do not seem to be grounds for
concern about the validity of the RD results.
It is worth emphasizing that the estimated effects in 2009 are as large as
in 2003. This suggests that parties have indeed been unable or unwilling to
adapt their linkage strategies to the requirements of the different electoral
rules. No learning seems to have taken place between the two elections. In
our conceptual framework, this implies that the programmatic party has
not established a clientelistic network to succeed in the majoritarian system,
and that the clientelistic parties have not been able to overcome their prob-
lems under PR — which it could have done either by successfully making
clientelistic promises at the party as opposed to the individual level, or by
proposing a credible platform.
5.2 Fixed Effects Results
Our second identification strategy is the use of fixed effects, exploiting the
change in population threshold from 2003 to 2009, that made some towns
change their electoral system ‘‘exogenously.’’ The results of the fixed effects
estimation of Equation (2) are presented in Table 4. Column 1 shows the
coefficient of having a proportional system, controlling for municipal and
time fixed effects, for each type of party. The figures are broadly consistent
with the RD results: Clientelistic parties lose 3.7 pp. of seats upon becoming
proportional, whereas the programmatic party gains 2.4. The in between
parties, are still in between, although with a negative coefficient close to
that of the clientelistic parties. Notice that all coefficients are statistically
significant (at the 10% level), even with only 36 observations where the
electoral system changes.
As mentioned above, these estimates may be biased. Column 2 presents
the intention-to-treat effects that deals with the potential gerrymandering
bias, where the indicator of proportionality is replaced by the indicator
of whether the municipality has population higher than the corresponding
threshold. The results are virtually the same as those in column 1: electoral
manipulation does not appear to be driving the results.
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Table 4. Fixed effect regressions.
Outcome vars 1 2
Clientelistic −3.75 −4.30
(1.26) (1.41)
In between −3.69 −3.54
(1.32) (1.49)
Programmatic 2.40 3.69
(1.39) (1.72)
N 1449 1449
N.varying 36 32
Standard errrors clustered at the municipal level.
N refers to the total amount of municipalities
N.varying refers to the amount of municipalities
that experience a change in electoral system from
2003 to 2009.
Overall, even if the fixed effects results need to be taken with caution,
they do provide evidence in support of our hypothesis in line with, and in
addition to, the RD results presented above.
6 Discussion: Is it Really Clientelism?
Our empirical approach allows us to claim to have identified the causal
effect of electoral rules on the share of seats obtained by a given party or
set of parties. Even if the effects are not always statistically significant,
we believe the combination of all pieces of evidence we provide make our
estimates reasonably credible. Thus we feel quite confident that there is a
differential effect of electoral rules on different party types. Moreover, on
the basis of criteria relating to the historical legacy of Moroccan political
parties (and supported by Political Accountability Project indicators), we
can claim that our party groupings do differ in terms of clientelism. We
thus interpret our results as saying that, according to our data, majoritarian
systems (as opposed to proportional ones) benefit clientelistic parties and
harm programmatic ones.
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However, even if our estimates are credible and if the grouping of par-
ties we make maps well into the clientelistic/programmatic dimension, it is
important to notice that there could potentially be other interpretations for
our results. In other words, how certain can we be that the differential effects
we uncover are driven by clientelism? Our party grouping could correlate
with other factors that for some reason generate heterogeneous treatment
effects of the type we observe.
We consider first the potential role of party size. The literature on electoral
rules and number of parties suggests that small parties suffer in majori-
tarian systems.30 Our results could be driven by this, if party size were
correlated with our party grouping. However, this is not the case for the
type of municipalities that matter most for our analysis (i.e., those around
the threshold). Measuring party size by the percent of seats obtained under
PR, it is clear that the clientelistic and the programmatic parties actually
have a relatively similar degree of support close to the threshold in both
years (around 5% in 2003 and 10% in 2009, see Figures 2 and 3). Thus, the
fact that clientelistic parties benefit when the system becomes majoritarian
and the programmatic party suffers, cannot be attributed to the clientelistic
parties being bigger.
A second important point is that the distinction between clientelistic
vs. programmatic parties correlates perfectly with the distinction between
regime vs. opposition parties in Morocco. Our results could thus be related
to a number of differences between regime and opposition parties other than
their degree of clientelism. Most straightforwardly, regime and opposition
parties could differ in their ideology. For the Moroccan case, this appears
unlikely because regime parties do not have a marked ideology and neither
has the Moroccan regime itself.31 Still, regime and opposition parties differ
in other, possibly relevant, ways. Regime parties have — for historical rea-
sons — a much bigger penetration of the countryside than opposition parties.
Moreover, by definition, they are also closer to the authoritarian incumbents.
This implies that they benefit from regime support that may translate into
valuable resources ranging from material resources to favorable reporting by
state media during the elections. Although these differences are important
for electoral results in general, it is much less likely that they actually drive
30 See, among many others, Duverger 1954, Cox 1997 and Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993.
31 Recall that regime parties had the lowest scores of programmatic indicators in the Kitschelt
et al. data.
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our findings about the effect of electoral rules on the success of different
party types. For this to be the case, these differences would need to either
change at the relevant population threshold, or interact significantly with
electoral rules. Regarding the threshold, as our validity checks suggest, there
is no reason to believe that any relevant characteristic changes specifically
at the population threshold of 25.000 (or 35.000) inhabitants.
Interactions of regime/opposition differences with electoral rules are con-
ceivable, although we believe much less plausible drivers of our results than
the clientelistic vs. programmatic distinction we propose. If the vote for a
regime party did in fact imply a vote in support of the regime, the same
support could be expressed in PR. In this case, we should see no differen-
tial effect of the electoral system. Differential effects could emerge if the
higher resources and state support enjoyed by regime parties were more use-
ful in a particular electoral system. First, electoral systems might differ in
their informational requirements. From this perspective, the most plausible
scenario is actually one where PR would require more resources than majori-
tarian systems, at least in a country like Morocco, where party labels are
not well established. In such a setting, a PR system requires investment into
the generation and dissemination of party labels and reputations whereas
majoritarian systems can rely on pre-established personal reputations. If
this were the case, better resourced (regime) parties would benefit from PR
systems relative to opposition parties, contrary to what we find. Second,
electoral systems might also differ in the type of linkage they encourage.
From this perspective, majoritarian systems might require more resources
to the extent that they are more prone to clientelism. This could explain our
results on the basis that regime parties use their more abundant resources to
establish better clientelistic linkages in majoritarian systems. Notice, how-
ever, that this story is very close to the one advanced in this paper, relying
as it does crucially on the argument that majoritarian systems benefit clien-
telistic parties. The difference would be that, whereas in our conceptual
framework programmaticness does play a role, here it does not: All parties
would wish to be clientelistic, but only those close enough to the regime
would manage to be so. For the Moroccan case, however, two arguments
stand against this alternative explanation. First, as we have discussed above,
some Moroccan parties have explicitly invested in programmatic linkages.
Second, in Morocco, cooptation has long been a key strategy of the regime,
so that any social actor willing to give up strong political stances may join
Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 29
the regime’s clientelistic network, a point well illustrated by the trajectory
of the historical opposition parties.
We attempt to assess in a more thorough way whether our results
are driven by clientelism by constructing an alternative measure of clien-
telism/programmaticness for each party and relating this measure to the
causal effect of PR on each party.32 The results are explained in the online
appendix. Although these results are merely suggestive, they do indicate
that parties that appear more programmatic according to our measure expe-
rience a more positive gain from a proportional system.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we argue that electoral rules matter for the success of clien-
telistic parties. We hypothesize that, when clientelistic parties are just col-
lections of local notables, these parties are more successful in majoritarian
systems than in proportional ones. In proportional systems with higher dis-
trict magnitudes, voters are hardly pivotal in electing their local patron and
so they have more incentives to vote for the programmatic ones.
We tackle the question empirically using two local elections in Morocco, in
2003 and 2009. Morocco is particularly well suited for studying the topic for
two reasons. First, because its peculiar party history makes it very straight-
forward to distinguish clientelistic parties from programmatic ones. Second,
and more importantly, because its electoral system is based on a population
threshold that can be exploited to uncover causal effects, using a regression
discontinuity design.
We find that electoral systems have a strong effect on the success of dif-
ferent parties. Clientelistic parties lose an average of around 4–5 pp. of seats
upon crossing the proportionality threshold in both years. These effects are
sizable in the Moroccan context, corresponding to the clientelist parties halv-
ing their seat share. We believe such differences can have strong implications
for governance as well as for the evolution of inequality and development of
32 Our alternative measure of clientelism of a party is based on the well established idea that
poor and illiterate people are more susceptible to clientelism. Therefore, clientelistic parties
ought to obtain relatively more support in districts with high levels of illiteracy and poverty
than in middle class districts, where programmatic parties ought to do better. Our measure of
programmaticness is then essentially the difference in electoral support in wealthier vs. poorer
districts. While this is by no means a perfect measure of clientelism/programmaticness, it
serves as a useful robustness check as it is a measure unrelated to our qualitative classification.
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different localities. To obtain evidence of these implications is left for further
research. Still, we believe that the present paper provides a relevant piece
for understanding the causal determinants of clientelism in particular and
voting behavior in developing countries more generally.
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Appendix
Table A1. Interaction between Clientelism and Proportional System.
2003 2003 2003 2009 2009 2009
Clientelistic × −4.07 −2.08 −3.79 −4.38 −3.29 −2.60
Programmatic (0.61) (0.70) (1.07) (1.20) (1.41) (2.34)
window All ±15K ±5K All ±25K ±10K
poly.order 5 1 1 5 1 1
spline x x x x
N.below 1383 581 64 1379 634 59
N.above 88 54 29 70 49 33
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
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